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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS IN MISSOURI
The Missouri cases evince no definitely consistent pattern as
to the applicability or non-applicability of the doctrine of
ejusdem generis as an aid in the interpretation of statutes.
Therefore, it is rather difficult to discuss the problem in accord-
ance with any symmetrical arrangement. However, some clari-
fication may be achieved by adherence to the following outline:
I. Definition and description of the ejusdem generis doctrine.
II. Discussion of cases where the doctrine has been invoked.
III. Exceptions to the application of the rule.
I. EJUSDEM GENERIS DEFINED
Several definitions of the ejusdem generis rule have been
offered. One of the most clear, concise, and correct is that formu-
lated by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Eckhardt:;
... where general words follow the enumeration of particu-
lar classes of persons or things, the general words will be
construed as applicable only to persons or things of the
same general nature or class as those enumerated. The rule
is based on the obvious reason that if the Legislature had
intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted
sense they would have made no mention of the particular
classes .... The doctrine of ejusdem generis, however, is
only a rule of construction to be applied as an aid to ascer-
taining the legislative intent .... 2
The converse is, of course, also a part of the general rule.
That is, when general words follow the enumeration of particu-
lar classes of persons or things, the general words will ordinarily
be deemed to bring those objects of the same general class as
those enumerated within the purview of the statute. However,
the doctrine is ordinarily stated in the negative, the affirmative
aspect being implied.
1. 232 Mo. 49, 52, 133 S.W. 321, 322 (1910).
2. For similar definitions and explanations of the ejusdem generie rule,
see: 59 CJ. 981-985; 50 Aw. Jun. 244-248; ENDLICK, INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES § 409 (1888); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4909
zt seq. (3rd. ed., Horack, 1943); BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 979 (1914).
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In the Eckhardt case the defendant was found to have violated
a statute which read as follows:
If any father or mother of any child under the age of six
years, or any other person to whom such child shall have
been confided, shall expose such child in a street, field or
other place with intent wholly to abandon it, he shall
upon conviction .... 3
The defendant claimed immunity from criminal liability under
the ejusdem generis rule, since she abandoned the child in ques-
tion in a street railway station, a location concededly not ejusden
generis with a street or field. The court, over-ruling defendant's
contention, held the rule inapplicable and affirmed her conviction.
It said that the "great fundamental rule in the interpretation
of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature,'" and that here the legislators certainly intended a
person occupying the status of the defendant to come within
the purview of the statute.
The Eckhardt case serves a two-fold function. It affords a
clear definition of the ejusdem generis rule, and at the same time
points out that the doctrine is only to be used as an aid in ascer-
taining legislative intent. It will be disregarded if to apply it
would contravene that intent. Keeping these two propositions
in mind, we shall now discuss those cases in which the Missouri
courts have made use of the ejusdem generis rule.
II. CASES INVOLVING APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
The rule of ejudem generis has been applied by the Missouri
courts in all sorts of cases involving statutory interpretation.
As was mentioned, it is extremely difficult to reconcile the deci-
sions and postulate rules as to the applicability of the doctrine
to each of the varying factual situations. However, there seems
to be some slight difference when penal, as contradistinguished
from remedial, statutes are involved. In the case of penal
statutes, we find the courts construing them strictly (i.e., in
favor of the defendant). Unless the defendant (or what the
defendant has done) is very much ejusdem generis with the
persons or acts specifically enumerated in the statute, no viola-
tion will be found. On the other hand, when the statute is
remedial, the courts adopt a more liberal attitude toward the
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1856 (1899).
4. State v. Eckhardt, 232 Mo. 49, 53, 133 S.W. 321, 322 (1910).
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legislation, and therefore less hesitantly find that a person or
thing is ejusdem generis with the persons or things specifically
enumerated in the statute.
It should be emphasized that whether the statute is remedial
or penal has no effect upon the applicability of the doctrine. This
aspect will not vary with the type of statute involved. Rather,
the differentiation arises in the second phase of interpretation-
when the court must determine what is and what is not of the
same general class.
In view of this difference in the interpretation of legislative
intent, penal and remedial statute situations will be discussed
separately. It must be remembered at the outset, however, that
there is no sharp line of distinction between penal and remedial
statutes; many statutes fall within a "gray area" between the
two. Because of this difficulty, the discussion will proceed in the
following manner: under "penal statute cases" will be discussed
only those cases where the statute is clearly penal in nature;
under "remedial statute cases" will be discussed all other cases.
It is clear that some of the statutes placed in the latter category
might be classed by some as penal, in certain of their aspects
at least.
A. Remedial Statute Cases
The ejusdem generis rule has been applied by the Missouri
courts in a number of situations involving remedial statutes.
It is difficult to categorize these cases either factually or doc-
trinally, but some grouping can be made.
1. Regultion and Taxation of Business.
There have been a few cases decided by the Missouri courts
involving the licensing of businesses, trades, and avocations.
In Wonner v. Carterville,5 the defendant, a baker, challenged
the validity of a city ordinance which exacted a license fee of
ten dollars per annum for every bakery wagon operating in the
City of Carterville. A Missouri statute provided:
The mayor and board of aldermen [of cities of the fourth
class, of which Carterville was one] shall have authority
to regulate and to license, and to levy and collect a license
tax on... merchants of all kinds, grocers,.... butchers,. ..
5. 142 Mo. App. 120, 125 S.W. 861 (1910).
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hackney carriages, omnibusses, carts, drays, transfer andjob wagons, ice wagons, and all other vehicles,... and all
other businesses, trades and avocations whatever. .. .6
The Springfield Court of Appeals, refusing to enjoin enforce-
ment of the ordinance, held it a valid exercise of the police power
under the statute just quoted, and declared:
The question is: Are bakery wagons ejusdem generis with
other vehicles enumerated in the statute? We think that ice
wagons and bakery wagons fall within the same general
class. They handle business in the same manner, go over
the same routes in the same way, soliciting business or
filling orders, and are in every essential respect similar.
A similar result has been reached in other cases. In St. Louis
v. Herthel,8 a statute authorized the city "to license, tax, and
regulate lawyers, doctors, doctoresses, undertakers, dentists,
auctioneers"' , (and about fifty other pursuits) without naming
architects. The statute then concluded, "and all other businesses,
trades, avocations or professions whatever." The Missouri
Supreme Court invoked the ejusdem generis rule and held that
architects were of the same class as the professions specifically
enumerated, hence taxable and regulable under the "catch-all"
clause at the end of the statute. And in Ex parte Smith,0 a
similar statute, naming several types of businesses regulable and
taxable by the city, and concluding with a similar general phrase,
was held applicable to plumbers, although that trade was not
specifically enumerated."
6. Mo. REV. STAT. § 5978 (1889).
7. Wonner v. Carterville, 142 Mo. App. 120, 127, 125 S.W. 861, 863
(1910).
8. 88 Mo. 128 (1885).
9. § 26, CHARTER, CITY OF ST. Louis.
10. 231 Mo. 111, 132 S.W. 607 (1910).
11. Ibid. It should be noted here that the Smith case was probably
wrongly decided. Under normal circumstances the case would illustrate a
proper application of the ejusdem generis rule. However, as pointed out
later in Keane v. Strodtman, 323 Mo. 161, 18 S.W.2d 896 (1929), there
was in effect then, and at the time Ex parte Smith was decided, a Missouri
statute which provided: "No municipal corporation in this state shall have
the power to impose a license tax upon any business, avocation, pursuit or
calling, unless such business, avocation, pursuit or calling is specifically
named as taxable in the charter of such municipal corporation, or unless
such powers be conferred by statute." [Mo. REV. STAT. § 8702 (1919),
which was Mo. REV. STAT. § 9580 (1909) when the Smith case was decided].
Thus it can be seen that while plumbers might generally be held taxable
under such a statute as the one presented in the Smith case, the above
quoted statute specifically forbids such an inclusion. In the Keane case
the Missouri Supreme Court refused to include as taxable, persons engaged
in the business of erecting, maintaining or repairing awnings. The statute
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss2/5
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Another case involving the regulation of business presents
an interesting problem. In Stall V. Frank Adam Electric Co.,12
the plaintiff was an employee in a retail electric appliance store
which was owned by the defendant. The store sold, inter alia,
washing machines. The plaintiff was injured when her hand
became caught in one of the machines. She alleged in her petition
negligence proximately caused by the defendant's violation of
the following Missouri statute:
The belting, shafting, machines, machinery, gearing and
drums in all manufacturing, mechanical and other establish-
ments in this state, when so placed as to be dangerous to
persons employed therein or thereabout while engaged in
their ordinary duties, shall be safely and securely guarded
whenever possible.1
In holding for the plaintiff, the St. Louis Court of Appeals
pointed out that the statute was intended by the legislature to
be remedial, not penal, and "is to be construed liberally in favor
of the safety of the lives and limbs of the employees who may
be employed about dangerous machinery."'14 The court went on
to say that it should construe the statute so as to include retail
stores, even though the defendant argued that such a store was
not ejusdem generis with "manufacturing" or "mechanical"
establishments.
It is difficult to discern whether the court invoked the doctrine
and construed the statute so that the phrase "other establish-
ments" included retail stores as ejusdem generis with manu-
facturing or mechanical establishments, or whether the court
held the doctrine inapplicable because to have applied it would
have defeated the legislative intent. It would seem that the
court's reasoning is but a mere verbalization of the conclusion
that the plaintiff should recover, a result reached on other
grounds. It seems difficult to reason that the legislature intended
that the statute quoted should include within its application a
retail electric appliance store.
under which the ordinance was passed was as all-inclusive as the one
relied upon in the Smith case.
12. 213 Mo. App. 395, 240 S.W. 345 (1922).
13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 6786 (1919).
14. Stall v. Frank Adam Electric Co., 213 Mo. App. 395, 401, 240 S.W.
245, 246 (1922).
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2. Miscellaneous Cases Applying Ejusdem Generis.
In a number of other varied factual situations the Missouri
courts have applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Where the
right to appeal from the decision in a will contest was available
to "any heir, devisee, legatee, creditor, or other person having
an interest in the estate under administration," it was held that
the general clause ("or other person") was restricted in scope
to persons of the same class as those specifically named in the
statute, and that by this construction the only eligible persons
were those having a financial interest or claim in the estate.15
In Mears Mining Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,16 the Spring-
field Court of Appeals held that an action on an insurance policy
of indemnity could not be brought under a statute authorizing
an action ". . . to recover any loss under a policy of fire, life,
marine, or other insurance.' 17 The court followed the ejusdem
generis rule and said that the insurance in question was not of
the same class as those varieties enumerated. 8
State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wilsowo presents an interesting
problem. There one X was the duly elected clerk of the circuit
court of Henry County, Missouri. His term of office was for
four years, but after having served for a short time he was in-
ducted into the Army of the United States to serve for the dura-
tion of World War II. A Missouri statute provided:
When any vacancy shall occur in the office of any clerk of a
court of record by death, resignation, removal, refusal to
act or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the Governor to
fill such vacancy .... 20 [italics added].
Pursuant to this statute the defendant was appointed by the
Governor to fill the vacancy thus created. A writ of quo war-
ranto was brought to oust the defendant. The Missouri Supreme
Court sustained the ouster. It stated that the ejusdem generis
rule was applicable and that one's being drafted was not of the
15. State ex rel. Goodloe v. Wundeman, 286 Mo. 153, 227 S.W. 64 (1910).
16. 162 Mo. App. 178, 144 S.W. 883 (1912).
17. Id. at 191, 144 S.W. at 887.
18. It would seem tenable that this conclusion is unwarranted. As will
be seen from the discussion infra, the ejusdem generis rule is not applied
where the things or person specifically enumerated in the statute are
themselves of different classes. Here "fire, life, marine," are certainly of
different geni. It could be argued that since different types or classes are
enumerated, still another type could have been intended by the clause "or
other insurance," and that the action in the Mears case should have lain.
19. 350 Mo. 468, 166 S.W.2d 499 (1942).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 13284 (1939).
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bame class of events as those enumerated; hence that reason for
a vacancy could not come within the purview of the statute
under the phrase "or otherwise." It is submitted that this rea-
soning is nothing more than a rationalization employed by the
court to reach a pre-determined result. Certainly the legislature
intended that, irrespective of what event effected the vacancy, it
should be ifiled. The vacancy occurred here, and the Governor
filled it. It would seem that the court felt itself compelled, as a
matter of patriotic duty, to leave the soldier's office open for
him. This motive is praiseworthy, but the result completely
ignores a relatively clear expression of legislative intent.
Above are discussed the cases involving remedial statutes.21
It is difficult to postulate any rules which the courts follow in
applying ejusden generis when this type statute is involved. It
may be said, however, that the ever present liberal attitude of
the courts with regard to remedial statutes is evinced when
ejusdem generis is applied, just as it is in situations involving
other rules of statutory interpretation. The discussion of
remedial statutes having been concluded, a discussion of penal
statutes will now be undertaken in an effort to discern lines of
distinction between the two classes of legislation.
B. Penal Statute Cases
The Missouri courts have applied the ejusdem generis rule
to penal statutes in the same manner that they have dealt with
remedial legislation. However, since the courts persist in con-
struing penal statutes strictly in order to afford defendants every
possible protection, the person or thing involved in each case
must generally be much more like the classes specifically enume-
rated before the courts will hold the statute applicable. In other
words, the rule will more frequently operate to prevent applica-
tion of a statute in a given case.
An interesting case involving the typical "strict interpreta-
tion" rule is State ex rel. Springs v. Robinson.22 A Missouri
statute provided:
The board [State Board of Health] may refuse to license
individuals of bad moral character, or persons guilty of
21. In Obetz v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank, 234 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1950), the
doctrine of ejusdem generis was employed to aid in the construction of a
will, although no statute was involved.
22. 253 Mo. 271, 161 S.W. 1169 (1913).
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unprofessional or dishonorable conduct, and they may revoke
licenses ... for like causes.... Habitual drunkenness, drug
habit or excessive use of narcotics, or producing criminal
abortion... shall be deemed unprofessional and dishonor-
able conduct under this section, but these specifications are
not intended to exclude all other acts for which licenses may
be revoked.23
The State Board of Health became suspicious of the defendant,
a doctor, believing that he was performing criminal abortions.
In order to either allay or confirm this suspicion, the Board sent
letters to the defendant, signed "Susie Davis," a fictitious char-
acter. These notes confessed that the poor damsel "was indis-
creet to allow my beau liberties which I should not have done,"
and pleaded that he criminally abort her. After several letters
of negotiation, the defendant consented to perform the operation
for a consideration of one hundred dollars. At this point the
defendant's license was revoked. The defendant appealed and
was reinstated.
The Missouri Supreme Court said that since the statute was
penal in nature, it must be construed liberally in favor of the
defendant, and that "where the penalty, as in this case, is oner-
ous, no one can be held to have violated its provisions, unless his
acts come within both the letter and spirit of the law."24 Turning
to the ejusdem generis rule, the court pointed out that all those
acts of dishonorable or unprofessional conduct enumerated were
affirmative acts, and that all defendant had done was consent
to do an act. The court said that the defendant had done no act,
and that mere willingness to act criminally was not ejusdem
generis with acting criminally. This opinion is, to say the least,
a very strict interpretation of the statute. It seems obvious that
the legislature intended to protect society by demanding of
physicians the highest type of moral conduct. Certainly, the
defendant flagrantly violated the spirit of the statute set out by
consenting to kill the unborn foetus in question. Perhaps the
court was impressed by the fact that the case arose out of an
attempted entrapment of the defendant and that there was
no real person whom the defendant consented to abort. But
this is no justification of the result reached.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 8317 (1909).
24. State ex rel. Springs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271, 285, 161 S.W. 1169,
1172 (1913).
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Other cases have also adhered to a strict interpretation of
penal statutes where ejusdem generis has been applied. Thus
where a statute required that persons seeking office in the
municipal assembly "shall not have been convicted of malfea-
sance in office, bribery or other corrupt practices or crimes,' 2
the 'St. Louis Court of Appeals held the statute inapplicable to
one who had been convicted of selling lottery tickets. The court
said that such an act "is not in its nature or turpitude to be
classed with malfeasance in office or bribery. ' 26
So also, in McClaren v. G. S. Robins & Co.,27 the Missouri
Supreme Court refused to rule that one who sold carbon tetra-
chloride without marking the bottle "poison" had violated a sta-
tute requiring such marking of bottles containing "any arsenic,
strychnine, corrosive sublimate, prussic acid, or other substance
... usually denominated as poisonous."28 The court pointed out
that carbon tetrachloride, a grease solvent sold commercially as a
cleaning fluid, was not ejusdem generis with the named items,
which were all drugs. Hence, it felt the product could not be
included under the statute's catch-all phrase, "or other substance
usually denominated as poisonous."
Several other cases have used the strict construction rule in
applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to penal statutes.29 In
fact, State v. Broderick '30 a decision rendered by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, seems to present the only possible exception to
this procedure. There the defendant was convicted under a
statute which provided:
If any carrier or other bailee shall convert to his own use,
any money, property. .. he shall, on conviction .... 31
The defendant was a bailee-converter of three mules, and on
appeal argued that by the rule of ejusdem. generis, the phrase
"or other bailee" was restricted in its meaning to a bailee of the
same class as that enumerated, i.e., a carrier. The court refused
25. Art. III, § 6, CHARTER, CITY OF ST. LOUIS.
26. State ex Tel. Vogel v. Busch, 83 Mo. App. 657, 665 (1900).
27. 349 Mo. 653, 162 S.W.2d 856 (1942).
28. IiL. REv. STAT., c. 38, § 184 (1937).
29. See Zinn. v. Steelville, 351 Mo. 413, 173 S.W.2d 398 (1943); Tucker
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 233 S.W. 512 (Mo. 1921); State v.
Dinnesse, 109 Mo. 434, 19. S.W. 92 (1891); Puretan Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 Mo. App. 848, 77 S.W.2d 508 (1935); McClaren
v. G. S. Robins & Co., 224 Mo. App. 265, 26 S.W.2d 818 (1930).
30. 7 Mo. App. 19 (1879).
31. Wagner's Stats. § 37, p. 457.
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to accept this argument, saying that to employ such reasoning
would defeat the legislative intent. Here would seem to be a
liberal construction; but it cannot forcibly be argued that the
result is erroneous. It will be noted that we do not have a typical
situation. There was only one class specifically enumerated.
Moreover, that class is distinctive and complete in itself. There-
fore, if the term "or other bailee" was to have any significance
the doctrine could not be applied.
From the preceding discussion it is evident that when penal
statutes are involved, the Missouri courts generally demand that
the person or thing sought to be brought within the purview
of the statute be one that is inherently very similar to the things
or' persons specifically enmerated. If not, the courts are prone
to say that the thing or person is not ejusdem generis with those
things mentioned specifically.
Ill. EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE EJUSDEM GENERIS
RULE
It is well established that the ejusdem generis rule is not one
which will be arbitrarily applied in all cases. Rather, it is to be
used only as an aid in ascertaining and giving effect to legislative
intent. When the doctrine will not serve this valuable function,
the courts will not employ it.
Two basic types of situations will occur in which the courts
will refuse to apply the principle. First, the court may find
itself faced with a situation wherein the person or thing sought
to be brought within the purview of the statute is in fact ejusdem
generis with the specific persons or things enumerated there,
and yet the court might feel that to hold the statute applicable
would defeat the legislative intent. In such a case, the court will
not apply the doctrine and will hold the statute inapplicable.
The second instance in which the doctrine will not be applied
is the converse of the first, i.e., a situation where the person or
thing involved is clearly not of the same general class as those
things specifically enumerated in the statute, but where, never-
theless, the court feels the legislature intended that the statute
apply to this person or thing.
There have thus been developed some fairly well-defined excep-
tions to the ejusdem generis rule. These are clearly and con-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss2/5
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cisely set out by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v.
Eekhardt.32
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, however, is only a rule of
construction to be applied as an aid to ascertaining the
legislative intent, and does not control where it clearly
appears from the statute as a whole that no such limitation
was intended. Nor does the doctrine apply where the
specific words of a statute signify subjects greatly different
from one another; nor where the specific words embrace all
objects of their class, so that the general words must bear
a different meaning from the specific words or be meaning-
less.33
There are, then, at least three instances in which the rule will
not be employed by the courts. These will be discussed in the
same order in which they appear in the above quotation.
A. Legislative Intent Governs
Of course, most cases involving situations where the courts
refuse to apply the ejusdem generis rule fall under this excep-
tion, and it can reasonably be postulated that this is the ultimate
reason for the court's refusal to apply the rule in all cases. It
should be pointed out that the courts often confuse the real
issue here. They sometimes say that they are not applying the
rule when actually it could be argued that the thing or person
involved is, in fact, ejusdem generis with the things specifically
enumerated. Whatever the reasoning used, however, the follow-
ing decisions hold that the particular statute does or does not
apply to the person or thing involved on the sole ground that
the legislature did not intend that it should. The courts wholly
disregard the question whether the person or thing sought to be
brought within the purview of the statute is ejusdem generis
with the persons or things specifically mentioned therein.
Thus in the Eckhardt case, the Missouri Supreme Court held
the defendant criminally liable for abandoning a child in a street
railway station, under a statute which imposed liability when a
child was abandoned in a "street, field, or other place. ' 34 The
court admitted that perhaps a street railway station was not of
the same clas' as the places specified, but affirmed the de-
32. See note 1 supra.
33. Ibi&
34. Ibid.
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fendant's conviction on the ground that the legislature certainly
intended to include the acts of the particular defendant.
The converse situation is illustrated by City of St. Louis 'U.
Laughlin . 5 The defendant, a practicing attorney, failed to pay
a license tax, in violation of a city ordinance enacted pursuant
to a statute which specifically enumerated some thirty businesses
as taxable and concluded with the phrase "and all other busi-
nesses, trades, avocations or profession whatever.I' M3 The Mis-
souri Supreme Court, in refusing to hold the defendant liable
under the statute, stated that if the legislature had intended to
include lawyers in the statute, it would have named them. Here,
then, although "lawyer" was certainly ejusden generis with
some of the named avocations, the court refused to place the
defendant within the purview of the statute.
The Missouri courts, in other cases too numerous to be dis-
cussed here, have refused to hold a statute applicable (or in-
applicable) in a particular factual situation on the ground that
to do so would flaunt the legislative intent, even though the
statute might well have been held applicable (or inapplicable)
if the standard ejusdem generis tests had been applied.3T
B. Specific Words Signifying Different Classes
Where the specific words employed in the statute signify sub-
jects greatly different in nature from one another, the ejusdem
generis rule will not be applied.
Caruthersville v. Faris-8 illustrates this proposition. There a
statute authorized the taking of private property by a city of the
third class (to which Caruthersville belonged), "for the purpose
of establishing, opening, widening, excavating or altering any
street, alley, avenue, wharf, creek, river, watercourse, market
place,... and for any other necessary public purposes."3 9 The
Springfield Court of Appeals held that private property could be
taken in order to expand a public cemetery. Here the purposes
35. 49 Mo. 559 (1872).
36. Id. at 562-563.
37. State ex rel. Pike County v. Gordon, 268 Mo. 321, 188 S.W. 88(1916); State ex rel. Blach v. Fry, 186 Mo. 198, 85 S.W. 328 (1905); State
v. Smith, 223 Mo. 242, 135 S.W. 465 (1911); Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo.
111, 132 S.W. 607 (1910); Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Mo. State
Life Ins. Co., 3 S.W.2d 1046 (Mo. App. 1928); State v. Brodwich, 7 Mo.
App. 19 (1879).
38. 237 Mo. App. 605, 146 S.W.2d 80 (1940).
39. Mo. REV. STAT. § 6852 (1929).
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enumerated were varied, and the court said that the use peti-
tioned for need not be ejusdem generis with those mentioned.
In State v. Turner,40 a Missouri statute provided:
If any person, or persons, shall wilfully and knowingly
obstruct any public road, by throwing... osage orange, or
other brush, trees or bushes in said road ... or by fencing
the same or by planting any hedge [thereon] . . . or shall
obstruct said road . . . in any manner whatever, he shall
pay a fine of not less than $20.41
The defendant dug a ditch in one of said roads. This act was
not a named violation in the statute, but the St. Louis Court of
Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. Although the court did
not place its holding upon the* exception now under discussion,
that exception seems applicable here. What the legislature in-
tended was to prevent obstruction of the roads, and it enume-
rated a number of widely different methods which would con-
stitute violations. Certainly, the defendant's conduct was of the
type that the legislature intended to prevent, and the court could
have held that even though the act of the defendant was not
precisely of the same class as any of the acts named, he had
nevertheless violated the statute.
C. Specific Words Which Exhaust the Class
Another instance in which the ejusdem generis rule will not
be employed arises when the things specifically enumerated
exhaust the class to which they belong. In such a case, it is
thought that the general words which follow the specific enume-
rations must relate to other classes of persons or things. Other-
wise, why would the legislature have used the general words?
One case exemplifying this exception to the rule is State v.
Smith. 42 There a statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person not now a registered
physician within the meaning of the law to practice medicine
or surgery in any of its departments, or to profess to cure
and attempt to treat the sick and others affected with bodily
or mental infirmities.. . 3
The defendant was a chiropractor and claimed that he did not
"practice medicine or surgery" within the meaning of the
40. 21 Mo. App. 324 (1886).
41. Mo. Laws 1883, § 33, p. 165.
42. 233 Mo. 242, 135 S.W. 465 (1911).
43. Mo. Laws 1901, § 1, p. 207.
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statute. He said that he merely "adjusted" difficulties which
arose as a result of some spinal disorder and did not "cure."
Holding defendant responsible under the statute, the Missouri
Supreme Court declared:
. . this rule of ejusdem generis is, after all, resorted to
merely as an aid in construction. If, upon consideration...
it is apparent that the Legislature intended the general
words to go beyond the class specifically designated, the rule
does not apply. If the particular words [here 'to practice
medicine or surgery'] exhaust the class, then the general
words must have a meaning beyond the class or be discarded
altogether. Certainly here the words 'medicine or surgery in
any of its departments' exhaust the genus or class.44
The Smith case shows clearly a legislative enactment in which
there was a clear intent to regulate anyone who professed to
cure the sick.
CONCLUSION
From the preceding discussion several generalizations may
fairly be made:
1. When general words follow the enumeration of particular
classes of persons or things, the general words will be
construed to be applicable only to persons or things of the
same genus or class as those things specifically enumerated.
This is the ejusdem generis rule.
2. In using the ejusdem generis rule when penal statutes are
involved, the Missouri courts are inclined to require that
the person or thing sought to be brought under the statute
be very much like the specific persons or things enume-
rated. A more liberal attitude is adopted when remedial
statutes are involved.
3. The sole purpose of the ejusdem generis rule is to aid in
ascertaining and effectuating legislative intent. The rule
will not be abitrarily applied in every case involving a
statute wherein a general phrase follows the enumeration
of specific persons or things. When to apply the rule would
thwart legislative intent, the rule will not be applied. There
are at least two specific instances in which this situation
occurs:
44. State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 242, 257, 135 S.W. 465, 468 (1911).
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a. When the specific words in a statute signify objects
greatly different from one another so that they do not
all belong to the same general class.
b. When the specific words in a statute embrace all objects
of their class, so that the general words must have been
intended to bear a different meaning from the specific
words or be meaningless.
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